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SEX, LIES AND VIDEOTAPE: THE
PORNOGRAPHER AS CENSOR
Marianne Wesson*
AbstracL The legal branch of the women's movement, although of one mind on some
subjects, is divided on the proper approach to pornography. Some feminists oppose the
imposition of any legal burdens on pornography because they fear that feminist speech will
be caught in the general suppression, and others believe that any such burdens must vio-
late the first amendment. Professor Wesson suggests that pornography should be defined
to include only those materials that equate sexual pleasure with the infliction of violence or
pain, and imply approval of conduct that generates the actor's arousal or satisfaction
through this infliction. So defined, pornography should be treated like other dangerous
consumer products-its creators and disseminators ought to be held liable for the foresee-
able harm that flows from its creation, distribution and use. Professor Wesson argues that
this proposal does not violate the first amendment, properly construed, and that it also
makes good feminist political sense. In particular, she points to the empirical link between
pornography and harm to women, to the lies about women embodied in pornography, and
to the silencing effect of pornography on women's voices. She suggests that these conse-
quences make pornography resemble other forms of speech that may, under the first
amendment, be regulated.
For some years now, the feminist project of transforming law into a
phenomenon more consonant with the experiences of women, and
more conducive to their welfare, has generated a body of "legal"
materials in a variety of forms-including scholarship,1 judicial deci-
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. More than most authors, I need to acknowledge
the contributions of others to this work. Singly or collectively they shared their ideas and
criticisms as I stumbled around in the twilight, they suggested other sources, sent me xeroxes,
told me I was crazy, listened to me on the telephone when I was stuck, and individually or
collectively had many of the good ideas that follow. For all this they have my gratitude and
affection- Carol Glowinsky, Glenn George, Claudia Bayliff, Helen Stone, Elizabeth Hyde, Joan
Welsh, Diane Mayer, Marcia Westkott. Thanks also to Emily Calhoun, who had one of the very
best ideas during a long and enlightening telephone conversation, to David Mastbaum, who read
an early draft and made some helpful suggestions, and to Richard Delgado for his
encouragement and insight. A version of this paper was given as the Austin Scott, Jr. Memorial
Lecture at the University of Colorado School of Law on April 25, 1990.
1. Cataloguing the universe of feminist scholarship would be impossible in a footnote. A
useful bibliography is available in the materials created for the April 1990 conference "Voices of
Women in Legal Education" co-sponsored by the Association of American Law Schools and the
New York University School of Law. See P. George & S. McGlamery, Women and Legal
Scholarship: A Bibliography (Working Draft April 3, 1990) [on file with Washington Law
Review].
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sions,2 statutes,3 regulations,4 and teaching materials. 5 Like any social
movement, the feminist legal movement has generated its share of
internal disagreements. Apart from the question of exactly what it
means to be a feminist, no issue has generated more fierce disagree-
ment than the question of pornography. As one woman put it, "Por-
nography is our Skokie. ' 6
The debate about pornography, together with the parallel debate
about what the correct "feminist" position should be with regard to it,
proceeds today in many forums, not all closely related to the law.7
But it is the legal debate about pornography that is haunted by the
fourteen words that comprise a central portion of the first amendment
of the United States Constitution: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .. .8 The first
amendment is a formidable obstacle to those who believe that the law
ought to prohibit, penalize, or regulate pornographic materials
because they cause harm. Many voices, including some self-identified
feminist voices, argue that such governmental intrusion is both
2. The question of what constitutes a feminist judicial decision is not easy to answer. Judith
Resnick begins to fashion an answer in Resnick, On the Bias. Feminist Reconsiderations of the
Aspirations for Our Judges, 61 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1877 (1988). See also Resnick, Feminism and
the Language of Judging, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 31 (1990); Wilson, Will Women Judges Really Make
a Difference?, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 507 (1990). One decision that might be identified as
feminist in its recognition and treatment of gender difference is State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d
221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (overturning the conviction of a woman for murder because of male-
oriented language used in instructing the jury on self-defense).
3. An excellent example is the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e(k) (West 1981), overturning the United States Supreme Court's refusal, in Gilbert v.
General Elec. Co., 429 U.S. 125 (1976), to acknowledge that discrimination against "pregnant
persons" is a form of discrimination on the basis of sex.
4. See, for example, the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
defining sexual harassment and treating it as form of sex discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
(1990). See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of sexual harassment.
5. See, e.g., B. BABCOCK, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES
(1975); H. KAY, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEx-BASED DISCRIMINATION (3d ed. 1988).
6. This comment is attributed to Mary Eberts in Callwood, Feminist Debates/Civil Liberties
in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 122 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985). Pornography is not, of course, the
only source of dissension among feminists. Even leaving aside countless disputes on issues of
theory, there have been differences about the proper outcome of litigation in other areas as well.
One of the best-known areas of controversy concerned the so-called Cal Fed litigation, regarding
whether a state could guarantee unpaid leave from private employment to pregnant women
without extending that same benefit to all temporarily disabled employees. Feminist groups filed
briefs amicus curiae on both sides of the case. For an account, see Williams, Notes from a First
Generation, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 99, 100-03.
7. See e.g., Kittay, Pornography and the Erotics of Domination, in BEYOND DOMINATION:
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON WOMEN AND PHILOSOPHY (C. Gould ed. 1984); Nead, The Female
Nude: Pornography, Art and Sexuality, 15 SIGNS 323 (1990); Vogel, Fine Arts and Feminism: The
Awakening Conscience, 2 FEMINIST STUDIES 3 (1974).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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unwise-in part because it might ultimately turn against other forms
of expression, including feminist forms-and unconstitutional,
because of the firm and inviolable dictates of the first amendment.
I. A PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING PORNOGRAPHY
Many thoughtful and original thinkers have concluded that the sup-
pression of pornography is too costly and dangerous a project for femi-
nism to undertake. I take exception to that view, and argue that
materials that equate sexual pleasure with the infliction of violence or
pain, and imply approval of conduct that generates the actor's sexual
arousal or satisfaction through this infliction, can and ought to be
exempt from the protection of the first amendment. Those who create
and disseminate such material should be susceptible to suits for dam-
ages by those who believe, and can prove, they have been harmed by
the creation and dissemination of pornography. I will refer to these
materials as the "new hard core," defined as depictions, in any
medium, of violence directed against, or pain inflicted on, an unconsent-
ing person or a child, for the purpose of anyone's real or apparent sexual
arousal or gratification, in a context suggesting endorsement or approval
of such behavior, and likely to promote or encourage similar behavior in
those exposed to the depiction.9 Although much could be said about
the mechanics of how such lawsuits might be litigated, I engage only
the possible feminist and civil libertarian objections to such a law.
9. while it incorporates elements of several definitions suggested by others, this definition is
not identical to them. It does not at all resemble the definition of "obscenity" created by the
United States Supreme Court. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. It is less inclusive
than the definition contained in the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance. See infra note 32. It does
resemble a definition set forth in Kotash, Second Thoughts in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP 34
(V. Burstyn ed. 1985), attributed to Jillian Ridington:
Pornography is a presentation, whether live, simulated, verbal, pictorial, filmed or
videotaped, or otherwise represented, of sexual behavior in which one or more participants
are coerced, overtly or implicitly, into participation; or are injured or abused physically or
psychologically or in which an imbalance of power is obvious, or implied by virtue of the
immature age of any participant or by contextual aspects of the presentation, and in which
such behavior can be taken to be advocated or endorsed.
(emphasis in original). This definition, which may well accurately describe certain community
usages, is nevertheless too inclusive to survive a challenge under the first amendment.
After this essay was written, I came across a similar definition in Pollard, Regulating Violent
Pornography, 43 VAND. L. REv. 125 (1990). Pollard's definition of "violent pornography" differs
from "new hard core" in some respects, and her proposal differs in its limitation to filmed repre-
sentations and its employment of criminal sanctions. Id. at 155. Pollard would create civil
actions as well, but only for intentional torts occurring in the course of producing violent porno-
graphic films. Id. Presumably she would not allow recovery for other consequential harms. Her
proposal is problematic in many practical and philosophical respects, but close in spirit to the
one set forth here.
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This proposal does not advocate censorship in the form of prior
restraint or criminal prosecution. Nor does it include in the language
defining "new hard core" materials terms that might lead to greatly
varying interpretations, for example materials in which women are
presented "in scenarios of degradation" or "as sexual objects for domi-
nation, conquest, or possession."' 0 The definition does not include
materials that many might find infuriating, humiliating, or degrading
to women, for example materials depicting women consenting to
receive sexual violence or pain, and in this respect as in others, many
would criticize my proposal as not sufficiently inclusive.1
I do not define the susceptible materials, "the new hard core," in
terms of the degree of their sexual explicitness, but rather in terms of
their depiction and endorsement of sexualized violence toward
women. 2 On a more theoretical plane, I do not argue, as have some
anti-pornography theorists, that pornography is a form of conduct and
not speech at all.' 3 Nor do I assume, as proposed by one constitu-
tional scholar, that pornography, although speech, may be regulated
because it is "low-value" speech having little ideological content.'4 It
is precisely because pornography, at least the subcategory that con-
cerns me, is speech, indeed speech that has a very serious ideological
content, 15 that it is dangerous. It is not "low-content" speech, but
"high harm" speech. In a formulation that may be only a little over-
stated, Robin Morgan has said that "[p]ornography is the theory, and
rape is the practice."' 6 Whatever else they are, theories are certainly
speech when expressed. When they concern relations of power and
10. These terms are found in the MacKinnon-Dworkin anti-pornography ordinance, see infra
note 30, and sparked some of the most serious first amendment objections to it. See Feminist
Anti-Censorship Task Force (FACT) Brief Amici Curiae in American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) reprinted in Hunter & Law, BriefAmici Curiae of Feminist
Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et aL, in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 69 (1988) [hereinafter FACT Brie].
11. See infra note 32 for an example of a more inclusive statute.
12. In this respect my definition differs from the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1973). It also differs from the definition of "hard-core
pornography" advocated in Taylor, Hard-Core Pornography: A Proposal for a Per Se Rule 21 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 255, 272 (1988), which depends almost exclusively on the visible explicitness of
the sexual material depicted.
13. See, e.g., Schauer, Speech and "Speech"--Obscenity and "Obscenity"- An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979).
14. See Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 602-08.
15. With this point many on both sides of the debate would agree. See, eg., FACT Brief
supra note 10, at 119-22; C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 206-13 (1987). But cf id. at 193-94 ("Pornography is more actlike than thoughtlike.").
16. Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape, in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT:
WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 139 (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
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equality between men and women, they generate quintessentially ideo-
logical speech.
Yet, when the definition of these "new hard core" materials is lim-
ited as proposed here, it becomes very difficult to argue convincingly
that the first amendment ought to shelter them, preventing women
who have been, and can prove they have been, harmed by them from
recovering damages as compensation for that harm. I will argue that
in addition to satisfying first amendment objections, the scheme pro-
posed here would satisfy various feminist objections that have been
raised about the regulation of pornography. After explaining how
lawsuits brought under this proposal might be won, I will briefly set
forth the different premises that have contributed to the feminist fis-
sion on pornography. I will also seek to persuade the reader that the
first amendment questions posed by the existence of a law permitting
women harmed by violent pornography to seek damages for those
harms are not as simple as the Supreme Court's recent perfunctory
treatment makes them appear.17 Finally, I will argue that rather than
subtracting from freedom of speech, the enactment of such a law may
well contribute to greater freedom of speech.
II. A NOTE ON LIABILITY AND THE PROBLEM OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE
The form of action that I propose against creators and purveyors of
pornography that results in harm is that of the ordinary tort or per-
sonal injury lawsuit. In such suits, plaintiffs must typically link the
alleged wrongful act with the particular harm suffered.
Some may doubt that such a causal link could ever be established
between the creation of pornography and harm to an individual plain-
tiff. Certainly, there will be many cases in which such harm has in fact
been caused, but where that causation cannot be proved. In a signifi-
cant number of cases, however, convincing proof may well be avail-
able. An excellent example of a case in which damages might have
been collected under the proposal that I set forth concerned a televi-
sion program in which a particular form of gang rape was inflicted on
a juvenile in detention, apparently prompting a group of juveniles
watching the program to emulate the rape using one of their peers as
the victim."1
17. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
18. See Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981)
(dismissing case on first amendment grounds), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
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Surveys illustrate that a very substantial number of women report
having been pressured or coerced to emulate pornographic poses or
performances depicted in photographs, films, or books.' 9 Victims of
brutal sexual crimes often seem to be involuntarily cast in their assail-
ant's private reenactment of scenarios they have read or seen in porno-
graphic materials.20 Scholars have documented that prostitutes
frequently encounter demands from clients to emulate pornography,
and that young women are "trained" for a life of prostitution by expo-
sure to pornography.21 Pornography is also reported to be prominent
in the sexual abuse of children.22 Given the significant incidence of
these instrumental uses of pornography as a tool of coercion, intimida-
tion, and abuse, one might expect to see a large number of successful
lawsuits under the proposal presented here.
Nevertheless, this proposal is not sufficiently comprehensive to sat-
isfy Catharine MacKinnon, who has written that requiring proof of a
causal link in each case of recovery under an anti-pornography law
would confine women to a "mop-up operation."23 I sympathize with
the criticism and, to a large extent, agree with it. However, the propo-
sal set forth here would impose significant costs upon pornographers
and their distributors. These economic considerations may conse-
quently diminish the supply, especially of the most violent
pornography.
A causation-based right of action is also the anti-pornography pro-
posal most likely to succeed in the courts.24 Many such suits could
withstand objections that the real cause of harm to the victim is the
intervening act of another (for example, a rapist) rather than the crea-
tion or distribution of the pornography inspired or used by him. It is a
well-established principle of tort law that one who creates a dangerous
situation or produces a dangerous instrumentality may be held liable
notwithstanding the intervening act of an autonomous third party.
19. See Russell, Pornography and Violence: What Does the New Research Say?, in TAKE BACK
THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON PORNOGRAPHY 224 (L. Lederer ed. 1982) (one woman in ten surveyed
in random San Francisco households reported having such an experience).
20. See, e.g., State v. Herberg, 324 N.W.2d 346 (Minn. 1982). The example is from C.
MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 186 n.108.
21. Giobbe, Confronting the Liberal Lies About Prostitution, in THE SEXUAL LIBERALS AND
THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 78-79 (D. Leidholdt & J. Raymond eds. 1990).
22. See, e.g., Burgess, Hartman, McCausland & Powers, Response Patterns in Children and
Adolescents Exploited Through Sex Rings and Pornography, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 656, 657
(1984).
23. C. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 204.
24. Causation is an important factor in free speech cases. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S.
105, 108-09 (1973) (anti-war protestor could not be prosecuted for disorderly conduct because
the prosecution did not show that his comment was likely to cause imminent disorder).
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Tort law is replete with examples of successful litigation pursued
against creators of dangerous conditions, even though the intervening
act of another contributed to the eventual harm.2" That the interven-
ing act is criminal in nature does not insulate the originator of the
danger from incurring liability, if the ultimate harm suffered, though
remote, was reasonably foreseeable by the originator.26 Thus, my pro-
posal is compatible with traditional formulations of liability for per-
sonal injury.
III. THE FEMINIST TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PORNOGRAPHY DEBATE
Although debate about the first amendment and pornography has
been taking place for most of the twentieth century, the debate had
until recently been surprisingly dull. The law as developed by the
Supreme Court permits regulation of what cases term "obscenity,"
conceived as an implicit exception to the first amendment, and defined
in terms so stultifying as to deter repeating them here.27 As Catharine
MacKinnon once remarked, to read the Supreme Court's words defin-
ing obscenity aloud is to feel like you're giving someone the Miranda
rights,2" so formulaic, familiar, and impoverished in meaning have
they become. The Court's definition of obscenity turns on two factors:
"offense" and "merit." If something has much of the former and none
of the latter, it is obscenity. The shortcomings of this regime are too
obvious and too well-known to require description here.29
The original and transforming contribution of feminist legal think-
ers to this debate consisted in shifting the focus of the relevant defini-
tion from offense and merit to harm. Feminist writers examined who
was harmed by pornography, and how, and then suggested that such
harms should be preventable, or at least compensable. Any discussion
of this subject must credit Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dwor-
25. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTs 301-306 (5th ed. 1984). Thus for example, in
Weirun v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36 (1975), a radio
station was held liable for injuries resulting from its broadcast promotion of a contest in which
listeners were encouraged to locate a radio personality who was driving in a conspicuous
automobile. Two teenaged listeners, vying for a location near the target vehicle on a freeway
ramp, provoked a collision in which the plaintiff's decedent was killed. Id. at 45, 123 Cal. Rptr.
at 471, 539 P.2d at 39.
26. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 25, at 305 n. 40.
27. The familiar account of the development of the law of obscenity is well told in L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-16, at 904-19 (2d ed. 1988).
28. C. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 174.
29. See L. TRIBE, supra note 27, at 904-19 (discussing the flaws of the Supreme Court
obscenity definition).
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kin, who drafted and lobbied for the first civil-rights model anti-por-
nography statutes. Enacted in two American cities, Indianapolis and
Minneapolis, 30 these ordinances sought to formulate an alternate defi-
nition of certain printed, written, or filmed materials to take the place
of the hackneyed definitions of "obscenity" that laboriously evolved
from the Supreme Court decisions. The ordinances proposed to regu-
late the distribution and exhibition of pornographic materials-not by
criminalizing such activity, but principally by allowing women who
believed their interests were harmed by the materials to seek damages
from the creators, distributors, and exhibitors. These ordinances were
similar to what I propose, but went beyond the "new hard core,"'"
including in their definition materials that were demeaning or degrad-
ing to women, although not depicting sexual violence.3 z
The MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinance was vetoed in Minneapolis, 33
but the Mayor of Indianapolis signed it into law. It was immediately
challenged on first amendment grounds, and held unconstitutional by
both the federal district court 34 and a unanimous panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.35  The Supreme Court, on direct
appeal, summarily affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance, without
so much as a single line of explanation, justification, or reason.36 One
of the most remarkable aspects of these events is that a group of
women identifying themselves as feminists, many with long histories
and credentials in the women's movement, filed a brief amicus curiae
in the Seventh Circuit urging the court to strike down the ordinance.
This unusual document is known as the FACT brief after its
30. The ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Indianapolis as City-County Ordinance
No. 35 on June 11, 1984, and became law there until declared unconstitutional in American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). A
slightly different version passed the Minneapolis City Council on December 3, 1983 as Ordinance
Amending tit. 7, chs. 139 and 141, Minneapolis Code of Ordinances Related to Civil Rights.
31. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
32. Their ordinances included in the definition of pornography, inter alia, materials in which
"[w]omen are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture, shown as filthy
or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual" and those
in which "[w]omen are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use or through postures or positions of servility or submission or
display," so long as these depictions constitute "the sexually explicit subordination of women,
graphically depicted." INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (1984), reprinted in FACT Brief
supra note 10 at n.1.
33. C. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 146 n.1.
34. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 771
F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd mern., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
35. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd men., 475
U.S. 1001 (1986).
36. Hudnut v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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acronymic authors, the Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force. It doc-
uments a profound rift in the ranks of feminists, and argues that the
court should find the ordinance in violation of the first amendment on
both conventional and feminist grounds.
IV. THE DEBATE AMONG FEMINISTS OVER
PORNOGRAPHY
Why would many self-identified feminists, other than for atttach-
ment to the first amendment, urge the courts to overturn an attempt to
afford women a remedy for harms they attribute to pornography? The
FACT brief, authored by Sylvia Law and Nan Hunter, is explicit
about some of its proponents' motivations. First, it suggests that the
ordinance and its defenders represent a strain of feminist thinking that
has elsewhere been called "sexual pessimism": the belief that sex and
sexuality are dangerous, even deadly, territory for women and that
women would be best advised to avoid them altogether or confine
them to safe and well-patrolled territory like monogamous heterosex-
ual marriage. In a published commentary to the brief, Hunter and
Law identify this strain of feminism with the "social purity" strain of
nineteenth century feminism, which sought the vote for women
because it was believed that once empowered with suffrage, women
could then enforce temperance, eliminate vice, and generally tame the
wild beast of masculinity.37 In contrast to this "pessimistic" view of
sexuality, FACT and its allies perceive sexuality as a potentially posi-
tive and liberating force that has played and can play a role in the
progress of women toward better, less constrained, and more joyful
lives.38 Moreover, FACT and other anti-censorship feminists are
unsettled by the political company that anti-pornography feminists
keep: religious fundamentalists and others whose agendas include
restrictions against the availability of abortion and in some cases birth
control, campaigns against the rights of gays and lesbians, and even
efforts to halt or reverse women's economic progress.39 But most sig-
nificantly, anti-censorship feminists oppose giving more power to the
state, which they fear may use it to censor or hinder sexually explicit
speech of value to feminists.' ° They frequently reiterate that the best
37. FACTBrief, supra note 10, at 102-05.
38. Id at 118-22.
39. See, ag., Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False Promises: Feminist Antipornography Legislation
in the United States, in WOMEN AGAiNsr CENSORSHIP (V. Burstyn ed. 1985); see also D.
DowNs, THE NEW POLICS oF PoRNoGRAPHY (1989).
40. The classic example is the well-known and well-loved women's health manual Our Bodies,
Ourselves, which has been the target of censorship campaigns. Robin Morgan has predicted that
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weapon against pornography is education,41 or to use what is now a
first amendment clich6, that the cure for bad speech is more speech.42
Without denying outright that sex and sexuality can be a source of
pleasure and connection between individuals, anti-pornography femi-
nists claim that many women would rather espouse this notion in the-
ory than make it real by identifying and attacking the elements of our
cultural construction of sexuality that are violent, degrading, and
hurtful to women.43 As for the company they keep, anti-pornography
feminists observe that the allies of anti-censorship feminists include
Bob Guccione, Larry Flynt, and many libertarian groups that are
intolerant of any exercise of state power, including some exercises that
are helpful to women, such as affirmative action.' Hence the com-
pany one keeps can hardly be a reliable index of the merit of one's
cause in this area.
Anti-pornography crusaders make some of their most interesting
points about issues of power. They observe that anti-censorship femi-
nists sometimes talk as though everyone's speech is utterly free and
unconstrained until and unless a governmental censor comes along
and constrains it. This formalistic model will not do, they point out,
as a realistic description of the experience of women.45 It is not just,
as A.J. Liebling once observed, that "[flreedom of the press is guaran-
"our culture is more likely to begin its censorship purges with books on pelvic self-examination
for women" than on pornography. Morgan, supra note 16, at 137. The Boston Women's Health
Book Collective, authors of Our Bodies, Ourselves, worked against the passage of an ordinance
similar to the Mackinnon-Dworkin ordinance in Cambridge, Massachusetts. FACT Brief supra
note 10, at 74 n.24.
41. See, e.g., Burstyn, Beyond Despair: Positive Strategies, in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP
161-66 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
42. The phrase is first found in Justice Brandeis' opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
43. MacKinnon makes this point most poetically when she says that those who ask her to be
more optimistic about relations between the sexes are asking her to "dream that the mind were
free and could, like Milton, make a heaven of hell or a hell of heaven." C. MACKINNON, supra
note 15, at 219; see also Leidholdt, When Women Defend Pornography, in THE SEXUAL
LIBERALS AND THE ATTACK ON FEMINISM 131 (D. Leidholdt & J. Raymond eds. 1990).
44. See Greschner, Book Review, 13 RESOURCES FOR FEMINIST REs. 66 (1985) (reviewing
WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (V. Burstyn ed. 1985)); McCormack, Feminism and the First
Amendment, 2 JuST. Q. 271 (1985).
45. Many writers, not all of them lawyers, have made this point. Among them is Andrea
Dworkin in A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 17 (1979) ("Men have the
power of naming"). Carolyn Heilbrun has described the forces that conspire to keep women
silent about their experiences, in C. HEILBRUN, WRITING A WOMAN'S LIFE 125 (1988) (It has
been "ridicule, misery, and anxiety, . . .patriarchy holds in store for those who express their
anger about the enforced destiny of women .... Even today, after two decades of feminism,
young women shy away from an emphatic statement of anger at the patriarchy."). Tillie Olsen's
book, SILENCES (1978), creates a sustained and convincing account of the forces that constrain
the speech of women.
922
The Pornographer as Censor
teed only to those who own one,"" although that is part of the flaw in
the formalistic picture. In this age of overwhelming exposure to infor-
mation, when the capacity of the audience to absorb speech is com-
pletely saturated, the loudest and most shocking speech often drowns
out the speech of others whose voices are less loud, whose ideas are
less simple, or whose delivery is less immediately appealing to the
audience.47 More importantly, anti-pornography feminists call atten-
tion to the silencing or censoring effect that the widespread dissemina-
tion of pornography has on women when they seek to speak and be
heard on issues of sexuality and sexual ethics.48 For these reasons,
they argue, the absence of any governmental role in discouraging the
pornographer may have the effect of actually promoting the drowning,
discrediting, and ultimately the censoring of women's voices on these
subjects. Therefore, anti-pornography feminists insist that more
speech is not and cannot be the answer.
Of course, these disputes about feminist theory and practical poli-
tics49 are not dispositive of the legal outcome of a challenge to the
regulation of pornography. Inevitably these debates are conducted in
the shadow of the fourteen words of the first amendment. Feminist
schisms aside, any proposal that seeks the regulation of some materials
not necessarily within the universe of "obscenity" as recognized by the
courts must contend with doctrinal and constitutional objections.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEBATE OVER
PORNOGRAPHY
Any serious debate about the first amendment must begin by
acknowledging that the first amendment is simply a collection of
Words-eloquent, moving, and venerable, but like all words, they
require human interpretation and construction before they become
useful in the resolution of constitutional disputes. Judges, scholars,
students, and ordinary citizens continually grapple with the meaning
of the first amendment. Hence to say that the first amendment does or
46. Liebling is so quoted ir R. KLUGER, THE PAPER: THE LiFE AND DEATH OF THE NEW
YORK HERALD TRIBUNE 341 (1986).
47. Others who have made this point, outside the pornography debate, include Baker, Scope
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964 (1978), and Ingber, The
Marketplace of Ideas A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
48. See C. MAcKiNNoN, supra note 15, at 208-09 ("Pornography is exactly that speech of
men that silences the speech of women.").
49. An excellent summary of the differences and similarities between the sides of the
pornography debate may be found in Berger, Searle & Cottle, Ideological Contours of the
Contemporary Pornography Debate: Divisions and Alliances, 11 FRONTIERS: A JOURNAL OF
WOMEN STUDIES 30 (1990).
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does not permit a particular type of governmental action is a rather
more complicated assertion than it first appears. Such an assertion
combines prediction about what a judge would do if presented with
the issue, a comparison of the action in question with others that have
or have not been accorded judicial approval, an appeal to a societal
view of what the first amendment ought to mean, and a statement of
advocacy. The following proposal partakes of all these elements.
It is commonplace to observe that the first amendment, despite the
absolutism of its first few words,5" has never been interpreted literally.
The first amendment, although literally addressed only to Congress,
has been applied by an act of interpretation to state legislatures and
courts as well.5" It is also held that certain laws may be made and
enforced despite their limiting or prohibitive effect on speech. Despite
what defenders of pornography sometimes claim, the first amendment
has never been interpreted as an absolute bar to the regulation of
speech. Sometimes laws limiting speech are approved by the interpre-
tive sleight-of-hand of denominating the activity regulated as "not
speech."52 Sometimes they are approved by simply declaring that the
first amendment contains some "implicit" exceptions, and that the
regulated speech fits into one of them.53 Whatever the explanation,
however, it is beyond dispute that courts have long recognized several
varieties of speech or quasi-speech as deserving either no, or limited,
first amendment protection. Some courts have recently begun to
incorporate new varieties of speech into these categories. I suggest
that violent pornography, of the sort defined here as "new hard core,"
has many features in common with four of these recognizably regul-
able categories of speech. A Supreme Court that allows the regulation
of these other varieties of speech must at least explain why violent
pornography cannot constitutionally be made the subject of suits for
damages.54 These four types of speech are discussed below after an
exploration of commercial speech, a regulable form of speech that is
sometimes elsewhere suggested as a fitting analogy to the regulation of
violent pornography. However, I consider commercial speech to be an
inapt comparison because its characteristics differ materially from
those of violent pornography.
50. "Congress shall make no law ...." U.S. CONsT. amend. I (emphasis added).
51. See, e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
52. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). For further discussion of
Chaplinsky, see infra notes 100-07 and accompanying text.
53. This approach best characterizes the Court's historical treatment of the law of
defamation. See L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 12-12, at 861-72.
54. In the case of some of the forms of speech discussed, even the severe suppression that
accompanies criminalization is allowed.
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A. Commercial Speech: The Flawed Analogy
It is sometimes suggested that pornography might be compared
with commercial speech, 5 which the Supreme Court has held calls for
less first amendment protection than other forms of speech. 6 The
Court also has said that certain commercial speech may be prohibited
in the interest of diminishing sex discrimination. 57 The argument for
reduced first amendment protection for commercial speech is sound.
Scholars have noted that the origins of the first amendment lie in the
impulse to protect the "dignitary speaker": by the description of one
scholar, the "vulnerable speaker of conscience, impelled to speak out
by the demands of humanity, yet subject to waves of unnecessarily
harsh parochial intolerance."5 8 Commercial speech, speech indulged
in for profit, rather than to satisfy the human need to communicate
ideas, seems in many ways a different category altogether. Recogniz-
ing this difference, the Court has held that commercial speech, for
example lawyer advertising,59 or price information about pharmaceuti-
cals,' while not entirely devoid of first amendment protection, enjoys
limited shelter: its protection seems in theory to rest more on the inter-
est of the listener or hearer than that of the speaker, and in practice
may be overcome by certain governmental interests-for example, in
preventing false or misleading speech.61 -
Those who recommend regulation of pornography by analogizing it
to commercial speech argue that there can be no question that pornog-
raphy is enormously profitable to its creators and disseminators.62 If,
by this reasoning, pornography were accepted as a form of "commer-
cial speech," one might argue that it may be regulated, especially if the
content of its message is false or misleading. If one further believes
that sexually violent pornography represents the embodiment of an
55. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772 (1982) (noting that the economic incentives of
pornography might make it harder to deter than political speech); see also Strang, "She Was Just
Seventeen... and the Way She Looked Was Way Beyond [Her Years]" Child Pornography and
Overbreadth, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1779, 1795 n. 129 (1990); cf C. MACKINNON, supra note 15,
at 177 n.44.
56. The most notable occasion was Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), which struck down the regulation at issue but
acknowledged significant differences between commercial and political speech.
57. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
58. Neuborne, The First Amendment and Government Regulation of Capital Markets, 55
BRooKt.YN L. REv. 14 (1989).
59. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1989).
60. irginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748.
61. See generally, Neuborne, supra note 58, at 32-33.
62. The most common estimate of the pornography industry's sales is approximately eight
billion dollars annually. See C. MAcKiNNON, supra note 15, at 179 n.54.
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insidious lie about women," the parallels to the regulation of commer-
cial speech seem superficially quite persuasive.
The difficulty with this analysis is that, unlike the examples of law-
yer advertising or price information, pornography is not an advertise-
ment created to sell a non-speech commodity or service. It is rather
speech itself, rendered available for purchase. Pornography is both
speech and product; it is itself an advertisement for certain ideas, not
for other commercial products. Arguing for the suppression of violent
pornography by analogy to commercial speech is therefore neither sat-
isfying nor defensible. Pornography is real speech-ideological, polit-
ical speech, speech very much about ideas. Its creators may not be
impelled to speak by the demands of humanity, but their speech is
appealing to some precisely for the ideas it assumes, presents and (lit-
erally) embodies. It is commercial in the sense that people pay to
purchase it, but the same may be said of the collected papers of Oliver
Wendell Holmes. Ultimately, the argument for regulating pornogra-
phy based on an analogy to commercial speech is flawed. Fortunately
there are other, more fitting analogies.
B. The Analogy to Sexual Harassment
The first category of regulable speech that provides a useful analogy
to pornography is in the law of sexual harassment. Sexual harassment
is an especially interesting comparison for several reasons, among
them that it was Catherine MacKinnon who proposed what has come
to be the accepted law of sexual harassment in the United States,' and
that the authors of the FACT brief expressed agreement with the
rationales underlying the law of sexual harassment. 65 As recognized
by the United States Supreme Court in a moment of rare unanimity,
sexual harassment is illegal as a form of sex discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.66 Hence it may be regulated and
prohibited, and remedied by compensation. Moreover, sexual harass-
ment includes not only the classic proposition-from-the-boss, but also
the much more pervasive practices of creating or tolerating a "hostile
or abusive working environment."67 It is thus potentially illegal for
male workers in an office to affix to bulletin boards or illustrate weekly
63. The lie is that women ask for, enjoy, or deserve violence or pain in sexual encounters. See
infra note 83.
64. Compare C. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 233-38 (1979)
with Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1990).
65. FACT Brief supra note 10, at 134.
66. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
67. Id. at 66.
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memos with Playboy centerfolds or cartoons that demean or insult
women-even if the materials are not "obscene" under the prevailing
definition of that term.68 The law of sexual harassment, on this inter-
pretation, unquestionably constitutes a restriction on speech, enforced
by the power of the courts to penalize not only the offender but also in
some cases the supervisor or employer.69 These decisions interpreting
Title VII have generated remarkably little first amendment-based criti-
cism. They are based on a recognition that the effect of such "speech"
in the workplace is to make it virtually impossible for women to be
treated as equals and to have their work performance judged by the
same standards used to evaluate that of males. If sexually harmful
materials, some far less insulting and harmful to women than new
hard core pornography, may be legitimately banned from the work-
place in the interest of equality in employment, then such material
should properly be excludable from other public places in the interest
of equality in other spheres of life.
C. The Analogy to "Clear and Present Danger" Speech
The second category of regulable speech that provides insights use-
ful to the regulation of pornography is "clear-and-present-danger"
speech. As every first-year law student knows, speech may be limited
if there is a "clear and present danger" that it will provoke a harm that
the government is empowered to prevent.7" If certain speech, for
example words of conspiracy or solicitation, create a danger of bank
robbery or arson, the words may be punished-not because they are
not speech, but because they are very dangerous speech, harmful
speech. To premise the regulation of violent pornography on this
aspect of first amendment law requires, of course, some empirical rea-
son to believe that its existence creates a danger of cognizable harm to
women. That evidence exists in a more than sufficient quantity,
although it is controversial.
Rivers of ink have been spilled in the debate about what the empiri-
cal evidence demonstrates. Different commentators make diametri-
cally opposing claims based on the same evidence.71 The best
68. See eg., Lewin, Ruling on Pinups as Sexual Harassment" What Does it Mean?, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at Bl, col. 1.
69. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66.
70. This idea is expressed in many decisions of the Court. The first was Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). For a useful discussion of the evolution of this idea in the Court,
see L. TRIBE, supra note 27, § 12-9, at 841-49 (1988).
71. Compare FACT Brief supra note 10, at 112-18 (research shows little or no connection
between pornography and violence or other harm to women, and those studies that do show a
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synthesis of the evidence can be found in the recent work of Donner-
stein, Linz, and Penrod.72 Donnerstein is a trustworthy guide in an
odd way because he has credentials on both sides of the question. He
testified before the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy, and his findings were cited by that Commission as a basis for
recommending increased prosecution of creators and purveyors of
pornographic materials. 73 On the other hand, he has publicly indi-
cated that the Commission and others have exaggerated the link
between pornography in general and violent behavior directed toward
women. 74 Although any discussion of the complexities of this issue
deserves an article of its own, a quotation from the book provides a
fair summary. Focusing on violent pornography (of the sort encom-
passed in my definition of new hard core), Donnerstein, Linz, and
Penrod write:
[Violent pornography influences attitudes and behaviors .... View-
ers come to cognitively associate sexuality with violence, to endorse the
idea that women want to be raped, and to trivialize the injuries suffered
by a rape victim. As a result of the attitudinal changes, men may be
more willing to abuse women physically (indeed, the laboratory aggres-
sion measures suggest such an outcome).75
Some critics have derided the effort to premise public policy on
studies conducted in the artificial setting of the laboratory, but Don-
nerstein and his colleagues understand and explain why "better" data
is not and cannot be available:
The social scientist would have a difficult time asserting that the
immediate outcome of exposure to sexual violence is actual violence to
women because it is not possible to design an experiment in which sub-
jects are exposed to sexually violent materials, then allow those individ-
uals to engage in any behavior that may threaten public safety.76
The conclusions of Donnerstein and his partners do not amount to a
scientifically absolute statement of cause and effect, but as science,
they are certainly as probative as the science that, for example, led the
relationship are seriously flawed) with C. MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 147 n.9 & 187
nn. 116-18 (studies show significant relationship).
72. E. DONNERSTEIN, D. LINZ & S. PENROD, THE QUESTION OF PORNOGRAPHY:
RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS (1987).
73. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 299-351,
901-1035 (1986). Donnerstein is cited throughout pages 901-1035. The conclusions of the
commission are found at page 299-351.
74. FACT Brief supra note 10, at 112-13.
75. E. DONNERSTEIN, D. LINZ & S. PENROD, supra note 72, at 20.
76. Id.
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Supreme Court to conclude that separate-but-equal education causes
low self-esteem among blacks.77 Donnerstein's data is more convinc-
ing than the virtually nonexistent data that led the Supreme Court to
conclude that women who work as prison guards suffer a greater like-
lihood of sexual assault by inmates than do male guards, thereby justi-
fying the exclusion of women from that job category.7" In short, if the
Supreme Court were disposed to see it (and whether they are will most
likely rest on extra-scientific considerations), the evidence of a link
between violent pornography and cognizable harm is certainly visi-
ble.79 What is more, the law proposed here would not permit the
recovery of damages unless the plaintiff could convince a jury that the
particular materials that are the subject of the suit in fact caused the
harm suffered. 0
Moreover, conceiving of violent pornography as potentially harmful
to women is not only proper first amendment analysis, but good prac-
tical feminist politics. Remember the anti-censorship groups' protest
that pornography calls for education,"1 not censorship, and imagine
the educational effect of these lawsuits, with their expert testimony
about whether or not such a causal link exists, and the press coverage
of that testimony. Imagine also the motivation such lawsuits would
create for more and better research into the relationship between sexu-
ally violent materials and harm. Law has always had an educational
effect,82 and the positive effect of these cases might well be substantial.
77. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.l1 (1954).
78. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977).
79. Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991) seems to acknowledge the validity of evidence that there is a link between nude dancing
and "prostitution, sexual assaults and... other criminal activity." Id. at 2469 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioners 37). The state also argued that there was a link
between nude dancing and the "degradation of women." Reply Brief for Petitioners at 11.
Although Souter stops short of concluding that there is a causal relationship between the
message embodied in nude dancing and the associated crimes, 111 S. Ct. at 2470-71, surely the
dissenters are right to chide him that if he does not believe in such a causal link, he ought not go
along with the majority's willingness to allow the complete suppression of the activity. Id at
2474 n.2. (White, J., dissenting). It is possible, then, that changes in the Court's membership
may alter the recent attitude of skepticism toward claims of harm done to women by
pornographic performances, especially since there was no evidence in Barnes that the nude
dancing in that case was pornographic in the violent sense discussed in this article.
80. For a discussion of the merits and drawbacks of this regime, see supra notes 18-26 and
accompanying text.
81. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
82. The creation and enforcement of laws has had a substantial educational effect on other
subjects, such as domestic violence, rape, the sexual abuse of children, sexual harassment,
discrimination in employment, the "right to die," immigration, racism, and countless others.
Even the "unsuccessful" MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinances changed substantially and irrefutably
the tenor of the discussion of pornography in this country. See generally J, HANDLER, SOCIAL
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D. The Group Libel Analogy
Pornography represents a lie about women as a class, a form of col-
lective defamation.83 Seen in that light, group libel seems a natural
comparison for it. The concept of group libel was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in a 1952 decision that, although it has
been questioned and criticized many times since, has not been over-
ruled. Importantly, the decision, Beauharnais v. Illinois,4 considered
the constitutionality of imposing a criminal penalty, not merely civil
damages, on the disseminators of the libelous material. In that case an
inflammatory leaflet alleged that blacks and civil rights organizations
were bent on "mongrelizing the white race" and that blacks as a group
were associated with "rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana
... ,85 Moreover, the statute did not recognize truth alone as a
defense, 6 so Mr. Beauharnais was not permitted to present any evi-
dence to establish the truth of the leaflet's claims. The Supreme Court
upheld Beauharnais' conviction over his first amendment objections.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the majority is very direct in its
reasoning:
No one will gainsay that it is libelous falsely to charge another with
being a rapist, robber, carrier of knives and guns, and user of marijuana.
The precise question before us, then, is whether the ... Fourteenth
Amendment prevents a State from punishing such libels-as criminal
libel has been defined, limited, and constitutionally recognized time out
of mind--directed at designated collectivities and flagrantly dissemi-
nated.... We cannot say ... that the question is concluded by history
and practice. But if an utterance directed at an individual may be the
object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish
the same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that
this is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and
well-being of the State.
MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE
214-22 (1978).
83. This idea is not original: it is presented in Brigman, Pornography as Group LibeL" [Tihe
Indianapolis Sex Discrimination Ordinance, 18 IND. L. REv. 479 (1985); see also C.
MACKINNON, supra note 15, at 192-93 (suggesting group libel as a partial, but not perfect,
precedent for antipornography regulation); Kittay, supra note 7, at 165-57 (expressing doubt
whether the group libel concept is workable); Longino, Pornography, Oppression, and Freedom: A
Closer Look in TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 48 (L. Lederer ed. 1980) (asserting that "pornography is
the vehicle for the dissemination of a deep and vicious lie about women"); Note, A
Communitarian Defense of Group Libel Laws, 101 HARV. L. REV. 682, 691-92 n.69 (1988).
84. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
85. Id. at 252.
86. Id. at 254 & n.1. Illinois law did not recognize truth as a defense in any libel action unless
the publication was made "with good motives and for justifiable ends." Id. at 265.
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In the face of... history and its frequent obligato of extreme racial
and religious propaganda, we would deny experience to say that the Illi-
nois legislature was without reason in seeking ways to curb false or mali-
cious defamation of racial and religious groups, made in public places
and by means calculated to have a powerful emotional impact on those
to whom it was presented....
... [WMe are precluded from saying that speech concededly punish-
able when immediately directed at individuals cannot be outlawed if
directed at groups with whose position and esteem in society the affili-
ated individual may be inextricably involved.87
Justice Frankfurter's powerful language provides a promising
rationale for permitting the much milder sanction of damages against
the purveyors of violent pornography.
Of course the law of individual libel, as opposed to group libel, has
evolved substantially since 1952. First amendment restrictions on the
law of libel are probably more powerful than they were recognized to
be at that time. In particular, it appears that at least some forms of
libel cannot be punished unless the defendant had some sort of culpa-
ble mental state," that truth may be a "constitutional" defense, 9 and
that the harm must have been somewhat foreseeable to the defend-
ant.90 Nevertheless, group libel is a convincing and close analogy to
the new hard core pornography. Probable constitutional limitations
on group libel are addressed by features of this Article's proposal that
call for proof that the materials advocate or endorse sexual violence in
a way likely to promote its commission.
My proposal does not, however, include a provision for the defense
of truth. Despite plausible arguments that the law of libel has under-
gone a constitutionalization of the defense of truth,91 it is not neces-
87. Id. at 257-58, 261, 263.
88. Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (declining to adopt a constitutional
standard of mens rea for libels of private persons, but stating that "strict liability" may not be
imposed).
89. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
90. This test was articulated with respect to "clear and present danger" speech in
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Although Brandenburg is not a defamation case, its
treatment of racially offensive speech could be viewed as a limitation on the scope of
Beauharnai.
91. Certainly this is true in the case of alleged libels of "public figures." Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). The distinction between "public figures" and other defamation
plaintiffs has never been clearly explained or convincingly defended, see L. TRIBE, supra note 27,
§ 12-13, at 873-86, and offers no confident answer to the question of whether the victims of
group libel-women, or blacks, for example-are to be analyzed as "public" or "private"
plaintiffs.
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sary, any more than it seemed to Justice Frankfurter of Beauharnais, 92
to permit every pornographer appearing in court to defend the crea-
tion or dissemination of materials that present, as the truth, a perni-
cious and destructive lie about women-that they enjoy, ask for, or
deserve sexual violence. To deny the pornographer this opportunity
may at first appear shocking. It is not, however, unprecedented in
other, analogous circumstances, even aside from Beauharnais. In
West Germany, for example, it is a crime for a person to espouse,
either in writing or in oral speech, the so-called "Auschwitz lie," the
claim that the Holocaust never happened or was a rather trivial histor-
ical event, sometimes coupled with the claim that widespread public
belief in the Holocaust is a result of Jewish or Israeli propagandiz-
ing.93 In prosecutions for this crime, the defendant is not permitted to
put on evidence to buttress this claim. The assertion is presumptively
and incontrovertibly deemed a lie as a matter of law.94 You might say
the reality and gravity of the Holocaust are officially beyond debate in
West Germany today. That is not shocking; it is reassuring. It would
likewise be reassuring if it became a matter of judicial notice in this
country that women do not enjoy, request, or deserve to be raped or
hurt for anyone's sexual gratification.95
Much of what is argued here about new hard core pornography also
applies to speech espousing and advocating racial hatred. Similar
arguments have been made about the constitutionality of regulating at
least some hateful and destructive racist speech.96 In addition to the
group libel analogy, opponents of racist speech often resort to the con-
cept of "fighting words" as an argument for the constitutionality of
suppressing such speech.97 It is "fighting words" that provides the
fourth and in many ways most compelling analogy to pornography.
92. 343 U.S. 250, 265-66 (1952).
93. An excellent description of this law and its operation is found in Stein, History Against
Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz"-and Other-"Lies'; 85 MICH. L.
REV. 277 (1986).
94. Id. at 287-88.
95. Others have noted the similarity between the treatment of women in violent pornography
and the treatment of Jews in Nazi propaganda. See S. GRIFFIN, PORNOGRAPHY AND SILENCE:
CULTURE'S REVENGE AGAINST NATURE 156-99 (1981).
96. See Delgado, Campus Anti-Racism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw.
U.L. REV. 343 (1990) [hereinafter Delgado, Campus Rules]; Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling; 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 172-79
(1982); Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2320 (1989); Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171 (1990).
97. See, e.g., Delgado, Campus Rules, supra note 96, at 378-80.
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E. The "Fighting Words" Analogy
Understanding the relationship between "fighting words" and por-
nography requires the reader to make a paradigm shift9s in thinking
about the first amendment, and to embrace what might be called femi-
nist method. 99 This shift is necessary because conventional explana-
tions for the lack of first amendment protection afforded "fighting
words" are either unconvincing or incomplete.
Since Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire " in 1942, the Supreme Court
has recognized that the state may constitutionally regulate speech that
has "a direct tendency to cause acts of violence" or "excite the
addressee to a breach of the peace." 10 "The test is what men [sic] of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause
an average addressee to fight."' 2 Yet the Court's reasoning in
Chaplinsky is curiously unpersuasive-it says that "[r]esort to epithets
or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of infor-
mation or opinion.' ' l0 But when one examines what Mr. Chaplinsky
really said, this explanation is not satisfying. Chaplinsky told a city
official that he (the official) was a "damned Fascist," and that "the
whole government of Rochester" were "Fascists or agents of Fas-
cists."'" These words seem quite ideological, quite communicative.
In fact, it must have been precisely the idea conveyed by Chaplinsky's
words that so enraged the listener. 105 The more probable explanation
of Chaplinsky, and that favored by many contemporary commenta-
tors, 1 6 is that "fighting words" tend to be the last words. When fight-
ing words are uttered, the marketplace of ideas, to use a central
metaphor of the first amendment, 0 7 is transformed into a marketplace
of fists or bullets, and speech is destroyed. Hence fighting words,
98. The word "paradigm" has been used in many works, most notably throughout T. KUHN,
THE STRucruRE OF SCIENTFIc REVOLUTIONS (1970).
99. See generally FEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY (S. Harding ed. 1987); Bartlett, Feminist
Legal Methods 103 HARv. L. Rv. 829 (1990).
100. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
101. Id at 573.
102. Id
103. Id at 572 (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940)).
104. Id. at 569.
105. If you are not convinced of this, imagine a court agreeing to place a ban on anyone's
calling another a "vegetarian" or an "Oklahoman." These epithets do not offend because their
content is different from that of "Fascist"--or of "kike" or "wop." Of course, different listeners
may be enraged by different epithets. But this difference in sensibility helps make the point. In
each case, the listener's reaction has everything to do with the content of the speech.
106. See eg., J. NowAx, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 942-43 (3rd
ed. 1986).
107. This ubiquitous trope was apparently first articulated in Justice Holmes's dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
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although strictly speaking "speech," do not contribute to the sum total
of speech in the marketplace because they operate to suppress other
speech by provoking the next likely speakers to fighting instead of
language.
This analysis has appeal, but begs for revision. Leaving aside the
male-oriented nouns and pronouns, the world-view reflected when
some are protected from having to listen to certain speech because it
makes them so angry they are provoked to physical violence is unques-
tionably male." 8 A feminist version of the "fighting words" exception
would protect persons from exposure to speech-and from a market-
place saturated by that speech-if it would prevent the responsive
speech of an average, intelligent woman. But that is far more likely to
happen because she is thrust into silence than because she is provoked
into violence. A gender-inclusive first amendment theory that values
speech in the way that the "fighting words" exception seems to do
would not protect speech that silences the voices of women.
Silence, no less than fists and guns, can entail the end of speech.
When one who has something to say is intimidated, derided or
defamed into silence, speech is again the victim. Under these circum-
stances, the marketplace of ideas cannot be enriched by "more
speech." It is my view that certain pornographic materials operate in
precisely that fashion, silencing the voices of women, especially when
they seek to speak their views pertaining to issues of sexuality and
sexual freedom, ethics, and pleasure.
How does pornography accomplish this silencing? As one sympa-
thetic scholar puts it: "[T]he 'message' of pornography is communi-
cated indirectly, and not through rational persuasion. The harm it
produces cannot easily be countered by more speech because [pornog-
raphy] bypasses the process of public consideration and debate that
underlies the concept of the marketplace of ideas."'" This is a
thoughtful and logical way of putting it. But there are other persua-
sive ways of putting it, too. Listen to the voices of a few women who
have found the courage to speak, and let them tell you how:
Suppose every gesture one made, every word, every act, signal,
motion, a frown, a wave of the hand, a shout, a scream, a kick, a rush of
words-each and every expression of one's psyche were ignored. Sup-
pose that in a company of people, every time one opened one's mouth to
speak, one's own words were drowned out by other words. Or suppose
108. My colleague Hiroshi Motomura made the thoughtful observation that the interests of
men from cultures that, unlike America's, do not stress macho individualism or confrontational
defense of personal privilege, are also unaddressed by this formulation.
109. Sunstein, supra note 14, at 616-17.
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that if one spoke into the waiting silence, one encountered no response,
no dialogue but instead simply a stillness, as if nothing had been said.
Along with defamation of being, this is the single most common experi-
ence that a woman has of her own real presence in the pornographic
culture. 110
The writer of the following passage describes the experiences of
Linda Marchiano, who was forced by extreme coercion to participate
in the film Deep Throat. The writer notes that viewers had no diffi-
culty believing that the bizarre and impossible sexual acts she per-
formed in the film were real and pleasurable to her.
Yet when Marchiano now tells that it took kidnapping and death
threats and hypnosis to put her there, that is found difficult to believe.
... It is therefore vicious to suggest, as many have, that women like
Linda Marchiano should remedy their situations through the exercise of
more speech. Pornography makes their speech impossible, and where
possible, worthless.'
If, because of the interrelationship of male power and men's ability to
define and construct knowledge, women's perspectives are not valued-
their voices are silenced or not heard, what they think is deemed not
"real theory" but mere ideology or emotion or experience, their exper-
iences are viewed as not credible or as too individually subjective to offer
any larger learning-then women in reality have little access to the mar-
ketplace.... Because those who invent pornography have the power to
make their visions into reality, pornography helps define women in a
way that renders women's contrary assertions mute-or disbelieved pre-
cisely because they conflict with the prevailing ideology.' 12
[Finally, on the enormous impact of pornography,] [w]e are speaking
of the female experience of silence. And now of the silencing of our
imaginations. For it is not enough that a false image of what it is to be a
woman be taught us... the idea of ourselves which our beingness cre-
ates by its own nature must be made mute. This is no small task. It is
not easy to erase the images which come from the depths of being. To
do this is like an attempt to silence dreams .... Our culture has a
terrible fear of women's dreams .... There have been so many poets
lost to us.113
110. S. GRIFFIN, supra note 95, at 242-43.
111. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 15, at 181. The story of Linda Marchiano's experience as a
pornographic film actress is told in L. LOVELACE, ORDEAL (1980).
112. Finley, The Nature of Domination and the Nature of Women: Reflections on Feminism
Unmodified (Book Review), 82 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 352, 369 (1988).
113. S. GRiFFiN, supra note 95, at 244-45.
935
Washington Law Review
If one is moved and persuaded by these voices, one may begin to
understand the terrible irony of defending the freedom of the
pornographer. Whether the work is called sexual harassment, clear
and present danger, group libel, or the feminist equivalent of fighting
words, it silences women. The pornographer and his defenders claim
they fear censorship, the loss of their freedom to speak and their
opportunity to be heard. But for women, the pornographer is a cen-
sor-he is the thought police, the slayer of words, the silencer, the
burner of books, the killer of poets. He leaves in the wake of his cre-
ations a vast and terrible silence; he prevents us from saying and hear-
ing important truths that we need to heal our troubled sexual spirits
and our equally troubled world.
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